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Section Leaders:
Soviet
Tank Development (part 4)
Part 4. The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945
As may be discerned from the previous section, on the eve of war, the
Soviet armoured-tank and mechanised troops were to be found in a
process of extensive reorganization and rearmament. The
mechanised corps were not fully established with regards to both
equipment and personnel. The
tanks with which they were equipped were mostly out of date, and the
new KV and T-34 tanks deployed in the Western military districts totaled
only about 1,500. The
pre-war theory for the utilization of armoured-tank and mechanised
troops once more became the basis for operations. It
was considered fundamental to develop the offensive in great depth and
at a rate of up to 80 km per day by acting in the operative depth of
the enemy defences. The
Soviets state, however, that it was extremely difficult for them to
apply this theory practically when under conditions of an enforced
strategic withdrawal. During
the first phase of the war, the Soviet armoured
forces suffered huge losses (lowest estimate 17,500 - highest 24,000
tanks).
The reasons for this are extremely varied and complex, and to
provide a clear picture it would be necessary to go into a lengthy,
protracted discussion. Nevertheless,
on the tank side, a few critical points may be expounded upon to give
some idea of the general situation.
In the first instance, the Soviet armoured forces were at the beginning
of an overall rearmament cycle. The
bulk of their equipment had been designed in 1931-32 with the
contemporary level of technology, and to conform to the general
philosophy of tank warfare at that time. This
equipment was in a process of replacement when the Germans attacked,
and as such, was in a poor state of mechanical repair and care.
Secondly, the organizational, tactical and operational procedures of
the Soviet armoured forces also were in a state of major upheaval,
resulting from a re-alignment to the large tank formations. At
the time when the Germans attacked, many Soviet units were in transit,
often separated from their equipment, and few really knew where they
were meant to go. Even
the General Staff had no idea where some of the units were, or even
destined for.
Thirdly, the Great Purge of 1937-38
had greatly weakened both the Soviet Officer Corps and the nucleus of
professional and experienced men. Rapid
field promotions resulted, and many tank crews had only a few hours'
gunnery or driving experience, and officers had barely more.
Fourthly, and very significantly, the
Army had been given a blanket order from the highest levels of command
(Stalin) for "No Provocation!" Reports
of sudden German attacks from the front on June 22, 1941, were
interpreted as "incidents" designed to provoke the Russians. It
was not until whole brigades or corps had actually been committed, that
the High Command began to take matters seriously. By
then it was too late. Invariably
large sections of the Army had been encircled or out-manoeuvred. Fuel
and ammunition depots, located in the border districts, had been
overrun and a large quantity of vehicles destroyed or captured.
During the first days of the war, the
mechanised corps deployed in the western border districts became
engaged in fierce encounter battles with the German panzer divisions. Two
of these corps were then deployed in the Baltic, five in the Western,
and eight in the Kiev Military Districts. They
were either being phased into combined arms armies, or remained under
the direct jurisdiction of the district commander. In
accordance with their training, they attempted to insert
counter-thrusts upon the main enemy groups that were penetrating into
the depths of Russia. Some
of these counter-thrusts were effective, but most were not. One
mechanised corps on the South-Western Front, engaged in a fierce battle
with the German lst Tank Group, succeeded in delaying its advance in
the Zhitomir-Kiev direction by several days. After
the first counter-thrusts, the mechanised corps were ordered to pass
over to the defensive, in co-operation with the rifle troops
(infantry).
Had the Soviet Army been at a higher
state of preparedness, and been allowed to develop, over time, greater
tactical awareness and knowledge of the realities of fast-moving combat
as it would occur during those nightmare years, it might have repelled
the German attacks by "spoiling actions" or surprise
counter-attacks. By
virtue of not having clearly defined offensive or defensive grouping of
forces, it was simply not prepared for any such operations.
Combined-arms formations and units at that time lacked sufficient
strength and experience to provide an effective defence or to
effectively resist massed attacks by large groups of tanks.
Under these circumstances, most of the mechanised corps had been
assigned missions of carrying out counter-attacks with the object of
destroying one or more of the enemy's groups of forces, and to win time
for organising a stable defence. They
seldom achieved their aims for a variety of reasons, including lack of
opportunity to lay on missions (of which many were clearly beyond their
capabilities), lack of intelligence on the situation, lack of
co-ordination and a general paucity of command capability.
Attempts were made by several corps to carry out co-ordinated
counterattacks. This
type of operation, however, required strategic formations of tank
forces having well-trained staffs and effective means of control which
were non-existent in the Red Army at that time. Not
having sufficient time to organize counter-attacks, and lacking in firm
control by senior commanders, the mechanised corps acted as separate
units under the most complex and unfavourable of circumstances. Furthermore,
within the formations and corps there was no clear-cut co-ordination of
operations.
Reconnaissance was often poorly conducted, without steps being
taken to ensure march and combat security. The
handling of POL and ammunition also left much to be desired.
During these critical operations,
Soviet tank units and formations usually operated as follows. Sub-units
equipped with KVs and T-34s were, as a rule, located in the forward
echelon, and were assigned the task of destroying the enemy's PzKpfw
III and IV tanks as well as his anti-tank guns. Sub-units
equipped with BT and T-26 tanks, making up the second echelon, were
deployed against the motorised infantry, armoured carriers and
artillery.
Due to the rapidity of the German
advance, which threatened the great tank plants in Western Russia, the
latter had to be evacuated to the east-principally to the Urals. As
a result, the tremendous losses of the early part of the war could not be
compensated for until this industry had been rebuilt and was back in
full-swing production. This
led to a very serious condition developing on the front lines where
tanks lost in combat were not being replaced by newly constructed
models. It is true to say that if the Soviet Union had lost just 1,000
more tanks in the autumn of 1941, the course of the winter fighting and
the whole of the Second World War could have been very, very different.
Following these tremendous losses in
tanks, on July 15, 1941, the General Headquarters made a fundamental
decision.
As a result, the small quantity of tanks still in service with
the fronts was now used only for direct co-operation with the infantry. Here,
the tanks were used to operate from ambush, to bolster up the infantry
in the defence, and for special counter-attacks. These
changes in the methods of using tanks necessitated organisational
changes to the armoured-tank troops.
From autumn 1941 all mechanised corps
and tank divisions (what was left of them) were disbanded. The
tank units were assembled into separate formations and assigned to army
commanders.
Motorised rifle divisions became pure rifle divisions. According
to Soviet sources, on December 1, 1941, there were only 1,984 tanks
deployed with the field army. Under
these conditions, the basic organisational units for armoured-tank
troops became separate tank brigades and separate tank battalions.
In the battles that developed during
autumn and winter 1941, these were used only for executing tactical, as
opposed to operational, tasks, both in defence and in the attack. While
this limited their losses, it was also a fundamental departure from
Soviet pre-war doctrine
According to the Soviets, the absence
of large armoured-tank formations in the Soviet Army at that time
limited its ability to develop tactical successes in operations and to
conduct fast offensives. They
provide this as one of the reasons for the failure to exploit certain
winter offensives, particularly that at Moscow. This
is partly true, but overriding factors were the inexperience on the
part of the Soviet High Command, the lack of experienced and
well-trained officers at the lower echelons, and the shortage of
military transport.
Once more applying their pre-war
concepts for the use of tanks, the Soviets maintained that "the
decisive and mobile nature of operations demanded both the
operative-tactical and organisational massing of armoured-tank
troops." At the end of 1941, the Battle for Moscow appeared to
both sides to be one of the most important of the entire war, which it
was.
Appointed as commander of the Soviet troops at Moscow, was G.K. Zhukov. Zhukov
was given personal authority by Stalin to concentrate practically the
entire Soviet tank force at Moscow. These
forces, now somewhat enlarged through the arrival of new tanks from the
Eastern factories, but even more so by the release of a large number of
troops and equipment from the Special Far Eastern Red Banner Army, had
the opportunity to apply this theory.
During the defensive stage of the
battle, the Soviets employed novel methods of combating numerically
superior enemy tank forces, such as the tank ambush. It
was essentially this, in the defensive sector of a tank brigade of the
first echelon a reinforced motorised battalion was deployed. Under
cover of an outpost, it organised a defensive area which appeared to be
real, having a false MLR (main line of resistance) and dummy antitank
guns, machine-guns and mortar positions. The
real MLR and firing positions were carefully camouflaged. The fire-plan
having been established, manoeuvre by on the most likely route of
advance by the enemy was planned, as were numerous fire sacks. In
the second echelon, areas were chosen for tank ambushes, which were
individually echeloned in depth and had flank positions in relation to
the most likely route of advance of enemy tanks. In
the ambush itself there was usually a tank platoon, at times however,
there might only be two or even one tank. Commanders of battalions and
brigades held a tank group in reserve to counter unforeseen attacks.
The critical approach route was mined.
As can be readily imagined, this form of defence served to maximise the
amount of time the enemy must spend clearing routes through the
defensive zones, minimised the danger to the Soviet tanks, and gave
them the opportunity to fire and withdraw without becoming too
endangered by enemy fire.
Prior to committing his tanks to the
attack, the enemy would lay down an artillery preparation. Most
of his concentrations in this case fell on the false position.
Motorised rifle sub-units usually
allowed the attacking tanks to pass right through their positions so as
to cut off and destroy the infantry advancing behind them. Vehicles
were destroyed individually by anti-tank grenades and Molotov cocktails
from close range while tanks that had penetrated deep into the defences
were destroyed by the surprise flanking fire of the tank ambush, at a
range of about 200 to 300 metres.
Having defeated the enemy from one
position, the tanks in the ambush quickly transferred to another
position to avoid losses from artillery fire and air strikes. The
unexpected and effective Soviet fire caused a certain amount of
disorder amongst the enemy troops, and disrupted their plan of attack. They
were under the impression that there was a considerably larger force
opposing them than there actually was.
In defensive battles, the basic
strength of the tank brigades and battalions was located within the
combat formations of rifle units on critical paths of tank approach. A
proportion of the tanks, however, occupied positions in combination
with anti-tank artillery, rifle, and engineer units in anti-tank
strongpoints and positions. There
were occasions when motorised rifle and tank divisions carried out
independent missions in co-operation with rifle and cavalry units.
During the counter-offensive at
Moscow, some 20 tank brigades and about the same number of battalions
were deployed. The
main emphasis was placed on the infantry forces; nevertheless, very
important missions were carried out by the tank troops. In
order to develop the success, improvised mobile groups were created and
made organic to certain tank brigades and cavalry formations of a
number of combined-arms armies. Although these ad hoc groups never
approached the strategic force which the corps could have been if
committed to battle at the same point in time, they were relatively
effective given the state of Soviet forces at the time.
Operating in close co-operation with
the infantry, NPP tanks provided the means of manoeuvre that
successfully turned the German flanks, and forced them to withdraw from
important lines of defence. Tanks were often employed in the group of
forces of forward detachments, which were sent forward to seize vital
objectives or escape routes along the enemy's line of withdrawal.
The role of tanks when deployed in
mobile groups is of interest. For
example, during the Volokolamsk offensive, two mobile groups were
formed by the Commander of the 16th Army: the
first group from the 145th Tank Brigade, the 44th Cavalry Division and
the 17th Rifle Brigade; the second from the lst Guards and 17th Tank
Brigades, the 89th Tank Battalion and the 40th Rifle Brigade. Turning
the enemy's flanks at an inward position, they then threatened
envelopment, forcing him to begin a withdrawal. Pursuing
the enemy, mobile group raced ahead and, through harsh fighting,
managed to free Volokolamsk. Despite
lessons learned, and the improvements in command tactics, the Soviets
continued to make mistakes.
They still tended to allocate tanks
equally between rifle units (as the result of inadequate intelligence
regarding the enemy and terrain), which made it impossible to mass
tanks along the main advance routes. They attempted to deeply echelon
tanks in direct infantry support, which resulted in a deterioration of
the striking and firepower capabilities at the very tip of the attack
while huge reserves followed up behind. The
United States of America made much the same mistake in 1944 when the
number of Shermans committed to front-line units was only 33% of those
in survival at any one time. The
others were in storage, reserve or shipping. In
the offensive, tanks would often move too far ahead of the infantry and
artillery, and they would be forced to return to them (sometimes
several times during a day), thereby suffering unnecessary losses. Subsequently,
the General Staff stipulated that tanks in a direct infantry support
role should not advance further than 400 metres ahead of their
accompanying infantry.
Experience gained by the Soviet troops
during the counter-offensive before Moscow, and in the other offensive
operations of winter 1941-42, was carefully analyzed. Based
on this analysis, the General Headquarters at first issued a directive
and then (on January 22, 1942) an order, in which was presented a
thorough analysis of past battles, highlighting deficiencies and
suggesting methods of avoiding them. On a broad
level, the experience convinced the Soviet High Command of the validity
of one of the most fundamental principles of their pre-war theory. This
was that, 'for the successful execution of an offensive to a great
depth and at a fast rate, in addition to separate tank units for
co-operation with the infantry, it is necessary to have available large
armoured-tank formations organic to the attacking troops, and intended
for independent actions.' The execution
of this principle in practice, however, required a large number of
tanks.
For this reason the greatest priority was placed on tank
production.
As a result 24,668 tanks were produced during 1942, with 50.8
percent being T-34s. According
to official Soviet documents, the number of tanks deployed in the
operative armies was 4,959 in May 1942, and 6,956 in November 1942. Apart
from the T-34 and KV tanks, production of the T-60 and T-70 tanks was
continued.
This was not by
choice, since the Soviets had already become convinced of the
ineffectiveness of the light tank. However,
T-60s and T-70s could be produced at a faster rate, and therefore
rendered great assistance to the rifle troops who would have otherwise
been left without any tanks at all. With
the growth in production of medium tanks, however, delivery of T-60s
and T-70s to the troops was discontinued, and existing vehicles were
converted to self-propelled weapons and armoured support vehicles. In the meantime, the
directive stipulated that separate tank battalions and brigades should
be employed in full strength, and in close co-operation with infantry,
artillery and the air arm. Tanks
should not be committed to battle without prior intelligence as to the
disposition of the enemy and without reconnaissance of the terrain on
which an action was, to take place. The
artillery was expected to carry out artillery offensives in support of
the front line troops, which included artillery preparations for an
attack, artillery support during the attack, and the availability of
artillery fire to forces advancing deep into the enemy's defences.
By the spring of 1942, the increased
production of tanks allowed the creation of tank corps. Mechanised
corps also began to be formed in the autumn. This
was not, however, a return to the old corps organisation. The tank corps
had three tank and one motor-rifle brigades and incorporated 168 tanks. The
tank and mechanised brigades, now having the very latest equipment,
formed the corps organisational basis. The mechanised
corps comprised three mechanised and one tank brigades and had 175
tanks.
During this period, operational units of tank forces were being
mobilised - the tank armies. At
first there were two, and these differed little from combined arms
armies.
At the end of 1942, the Soviets also began to form heavy-tank
regiments.
The first two tank armies (the 3rd and
the 5th), formed in April-May 1942, were of mixed composition and
comprised tank corps, rifle divisions, cavalry formations, artillery
and mortar units, and various supporting sub-units. In
the view of the Soviet High Command they were intended for
independently breaking through prepared enemy defences and for
developing the success in operations.
The tank corps and tank armies were
used for the first time during the summer of 1942. Amongst
other operations, they participated in the Kharkov operation on the
South-Western Front where the Soviet Army was conducting defensive
actions; during the battle on the Bryansk Front; on the Voronezh Front,
and on the avenues of approach to Stalingrad.
During the
early days, with lack of experience, the Soviets made many mistakes in
deploying these corps and armies. At
times they were committed to battle at the wrong moment, or given
assignments outside of the unit's capabilities, or were thrown into
battle piecemeal rather than together. There was still a
lack of experience on the part of the command nucleus and staff. This
was evident when planning and organizing combat operations at short
notice, when controlling forces during meeting engagements or under
rapidly changing and complex conditions, and inadequate co-ordination
of action within their own combat elements and with respect to other
combat and supporting arms. Drastic
measures were taken in an attempt to eliminate these deficiencies. Command
cadres, staffs and large numbers of tank crews had to be trained
forthwith.
This was successfully carried out, but was a painful process
which always took too long, and whose delays were paid for in blood by
the front-line soldiers. The
manoeuvrability and mobility of the units improved, and their aptitude
for tactical and operational coordinated action with other combat arms
and services also increased.
Awareness of these errors, coupled with the combat experience gained
during the 1942 battles, enabled the Soviet High Command to determine
new principles for utilising the corps in future battles and
operations, and these were set out in NKO Order No 325, dated October
16 1942.
According to this, separate tank brigades and regiments were to
be used for the direct support of infantry, and tank and mechanised
corps were to be made available to fronts. Tank armies
were to be reserved for use along the main direction as, "echelons
for the development of the success". These
were to insert powerful thrusts with the aim of cutting off and
encircling large enemy groups. Which were later to be invested by the
following infantry and cavalry forces
The basic points of the order were put
into practice during the counter-offensive at Stalingrad. In
this battle the armoured-tank and mechanised troops became the basic
thrust force of the land troops. 15 tank and mechanised corps were used
in this operation, and during the course of the counter offensive they
were used as echelons for the development of the success by the Soviet
Army, attacking along the main direction.
They were
usually introduced into battle during the first day of an offensive to
complete the breakthrough of the enemy defences, once the initial
infantry-led assault had made some progress but was beginning to
falter.
If successful, the corps swarmed independently of the combined
arms formations into the operative depth of the enemy defences, often
penetrating from 100-240 km. Wise
German commanders used this eagerness of the Soviet Command against
them, and allowed the Soviets to sprawl large tank forces throughout
the depth of the German rear where, unsupplied and unsupported, they
were easily destroyed by concentrated, mobile German tank-infantry
battle-groups.
After overcoming the tactical zone of
defences, the tank and mechanised corps directed their main effort
towards a swift penetration into the depth of the enemy defences. The
average daily rate of advance by the corps when developing the success
was put at 30-35 km, and the maximum reached 60-70 km.
In the meantime, the basis for
operational and tactical employment of tank forces was reflected in
their new organisational structure. To
reinforce rifle formations, it was decided to use separate tank
brigades and regiments. These
were employed as groups, having direct infantry support roles (NPP). Separate
regiments, however, equipped with heavy tanks, were intended mainly for
combating enemy tanks and self-propelled artillery.
Separate tank brigades usually
consisted of three tank and a motorised (rifle) battalions, an
artillery battalion, a combat-engineer company, an anti-aircraft
battery, and sub-units for combat security and technical supply. There
were 65 tanks in a brigade, but there were other variations in tank
brigade organisation.
As a rule, separate tank regiments
consisted of five tank and one mechanised rifle companies, an artillery
battery and other combat security and technical supply units.
Following the battle on the Volga, the
tank and mechanised corps were used on a wide scale and played an
important part in the winter 1942-43 campaigns. In
these operations, several corps were utilised for developing the
operative success along the main direction. The
co-ordination between these corps, however, left much to be desired,
principally as the result of a inefficient administrative and supply
organisation.
It was in the
operations of the winter of 1942-43, that the tank armies were used. These
were massive, armoured tank organisations that were powerful, highly
manoeuvrable operative units. Experience
with the heterogeneous tank armies showed, however, that such a
structure did not allow them to conduct operations of manoeuvre. It
had been found that the army commanders could not direct their troops
clearly, nor could they maintain continuous inter-co-operation between
the various formations with their differing mobility's.
In January
1943, the Soviet High Command agreed on the decision to form
homogeneous tank armies. Within
that year, five tank armies of this type were formed, comprised of one
to two tank corps and one mechanised corps as well as supporting units. From
here on, an army establishment included a light artillery brigade, an
anti-tank artillery division and other units. In January 1944, the
6th Tank Army was formed. The
fighting establishment of a tank army amounted to 600-700 tanks and SPs,
500-600 guns and mortars, and 305,000 men. When
attached to a front, tank armies were used as echelons for the
development of the success during the offensive, and as a powerful
means of inflicting counter-thrusts in defence. This
is a clear evolution of earlier Soviet tactical thought.
Throughout 1943, the organizational
forms of the other types of armoured tank troops were improved. The
combat establishments of the tank and mechanised corps were increased
as the result of the inclusion of self-propelled artillery, mortar and
anti-aircraft units, liaison sub-units and engineers. The
tank corps totaled 207 tanks and 63 SPs, whilst the mechanised had 183
tanks and 63 SPs. They
were composed only of medium tanks.
For reinforcing
their infantry elements, the Soviets used separate tank brigades, tank
and self-propelled artillery regiments, and heavy-tank regiments.
At this time,
the basic type of tank remained the T-34 medium tank, which was
re-armed with the 85mm gun (T-34-85). Towards
the end of 1943, the Soviet tank industry began to turn out the Iosef
Stalin heavy tank (IS-I), and production began of several types of
self-propelled artillery mounting-the SU-76, 85, 100 and the ISU-122,
152.
When using NPP tanks to break through
enemy defences, the Soviets continued to maintain strict central
control in the hands of the rifle division commander. It
was only towards the end of 1944, and in 1945, when the number of NPP
tanks had increased considerably, that it was possible to parcel out
tank units to rifle regiments and battalions.
In general, the co-ordinated use of
tanks in a direct infantry support role, alongside infantry, artillery
and engineers, greatly improved. The
Field Service Regulations issued during 1943, in which precise
directions for the combat employment of tanks in an infantry support (NPP)
role were defined, greatly facilitated the improvement of this
co-operative action.
In 1943, the Soviets still lacked
experience in the use of the new tank armies, and most of the army
commanders were consulted for their opinions over this. After
combining all these opinions, the Soviet High Command decided the basic
method for using tank armies at the start of offensive operations would
be as follows: "they should be introduced for the breakthrough
after the rifle formations have overcome the main defensive zone or all
the tactical defensive zones of the enemy." It
was concluded that, following this, a swift operation by the army
should be carried out in the operative depth, in co-operation with
aircraft and isolated from the main force.
In July 1943, the active army
possessed 9,918 tanks and self-propelled guns, which gave it a distinct
numerical superiority over that of the Germans.
During the Battle of Kursk, all five
tank armies took part, as well as 15 separate tank and mechanised corps
and many separate tank brigades and regiments. In
the defence, separate tank and self-propelled artillery units operated
in close co-operation with the infantry and were made organic to the
rifle formations. Tank armies and
separate tank corps were used for two main roles: firstly, to hold
prepared defensive zones either in co-operation with, or independent
of, combined arms armies, and secondly, for inserting powerful
counter-thrusts. Once
the Soviets moved over to the offensive, the armoured-tank troops were
used to conduct wide sweeping movements.
Three tank armies (3rd Guards, 2nd and
4th) operated in the Orlovsk direction, in combination with seven
separate tank corps. These
operations were, however, not very mobile due to the nature of the
enemy defences, and the tank armies could not achieve a fast rate of
advance.
They did, however, provide great force to the advancing fronts
by storming numerous defensive positions.
The operations by the two tank armies
in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction (5th Guards and lst), co-operating
with seven separate corps, took on a different character. As
at the Battle of Stalingrad, the separate corps were used as echelons
for the development of the successes by combined-arms armies, and the
two tank armies likewise for the Voronezh Front. For
the first time, the tank armies were used here to break through the
tactical zone of defences, and then to swiftly develop the offensive. By
the fifth day of the offensive, they had sheered the enemy group and
facilitated its subsequent encirclement.
During the final period of the war,
the quantity of armoured vehicles available increased tremendously. At
the beginning of 1944, the active army disposed of 5,357 tanks and SPs. Despite
huge losses at Kursk and in the Ukraine, from June 1944 the tank park
of the active army was brought up to 7,753 tanks and SPs and, by
January 1945, to 12,900 tanks and SPs.
During the initial operations of 1944,
the Soviet Army inserted a main thrust into the Ukraine. Here
all six tank armies were used together with eight separate tank and
mechanised corps and a considerable number of separate tank brigades
and regiments. With
this mass of troops and equipment they formed powerful 'front mobile
groups' which accelerated the achievements of successes. This doctrinal
usage was adopted in part by the Warsaw pact, whose Operational
Manouvre Groups of Red Storm Rising fame are direct linear descendants
of this concept.
During 1944, a main thrust was
inserted by the Soviet Army in the central sector of the Soviet-German
Front-in Belorussia and the Western Ukraine. The
basic mass of the tank troops was used here, comprising five tank
armies, ten separate tank and mechanised corps and several scores of
separate brigades and regiments. The
corps and armies created echelons for the development of the success by
armies and fronts respectively. To
develop the successes of these fronts, horse-cavalry/mechanised groups
were set up.
In these operations, the offensive was carried to depths of
350-550 km.
From December 1944 on, guards heavy tank brigades of the Supreme
Command Reserve (RVGK) were activated for use in supporting forces when
breaking through enemy tactical defence zones. They
increased the penetrative capability of advancing forces and the
stability of co-ordinated operations.
The next phase was the thrust from the
Vistula to the Oder in January 1945. Here
the Soviet High Command deployed the largest-ever mass of armoured-tank
troops: four tank armies, five separate tank and one mechanised corps
(16 corps altogether), six separate tank and two self-propelled
artillery brigades, and 23 tank and 41 self-propelled artillery
regiments.
Altogether, these comprised some 7,500 tanks and SPs. Within
22 days, the Soviet troops had moved forward from the Vistula to the
Oder, a distance of over 600 km.
During the subsequent battle for
Berlin, 6,000 tanks and SPs were massed. On
the active sector four tank armies were deployed; two of these (3rd and
4th Guards), after taking Berlin, moved swiftly to Prague where they
joined with the 6th Guards Tank Army in the 'liberation' of the city. The final armoured operation by the Russians in this war was that for the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria. The bulk of the units were made organic to the Transbaikal Front which inserted a main thrust across the Great Khingan mountain range into the central region of Manchuria. The 6th Tank Army was deployed in the first operative echelon of the front together with other tank formations. Their appearance in the rear of the Japanese Army made a great contribution to its final defeat. In fact, this was probably the fastest land operation in military history.
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